Whose Body Is It? The Body without Organs and Symphrenia

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First published on The Wider Existence, 9 November 2026. By Helen Edgar and David Gray-Hammond.

Part 1: The body without organs, the plane of consistency, and thinking-feeling with others

Deleuze and Guattari title one of the plateaus in A Thousand Plateaus “How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 149).

I have read that title many times, but only recently noticed how much weight the word “yourself” carries. It points to a single body and a single self doing the making. As an Autistic and ADHD person who spends much of my life in the neurodivergent community, I find the question shifts when I ask it from among other people. I start wondering whose body it is, and who else is involved in the making.

David and I have been developing the concept of symphrenia, a connected bodymind that thinks and feels with others, including more-than-human others, and that attends to how these relations connect us with the wider cosmos (Edgar & Gray-Hammond, 2026). In this post we want to set it beside the Body without Organs (BwO) and look carefully at where the two concepts meet and where they may pull apart. Where the first person appears, it is Helen writing from her own experience.

The Body without Organs, briefly

Deleuze and Guattari borrow the phrase BwO from Antonin Artaud, who raged against his organs as intrusions, demands and judgements imposed on a body that wanted to live another way. Artaud lived with illness from childhood and spent around nine years confined in psychiatric asylums. Deleuze and Guattari set the BwO against what they call the organism: the arrangement that gives every part of a body a fixed function and decides which uses count. We read the organism as closely bound up with neuronormativity, and we read the BwO as what emerges when we intentionally disconnect from and rearrange ourselves relative to neuronormativity and the systems it upholds. It is a field where intensities, sensations, and connections can move more freely (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). This holds a paradox: we disconnect on purpose so that we can reconnect in other ways.

Deleuze (1988) returns repeatedly to Spinoza’s observation that we do not yet know what a body can do, and to his definition of a body as a capacity to affect and be affected. From this view a bodymind can only be understood through its relations, through what it meets and what it joins with. That gives symphrenia an opening, a way of neuroqueering our relations as we move towards a Body without Organs, a limit we approach and never fully reach.

A body that is never simply one

The plateau on the BwO is populated by lonely figures. The hypochondriac, the paranoid, the schizo, the drugged body and the masochist each make, or fail to make, a BwO largely on their own (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). We think it would be inaccurate to claim that Deleuze and Guattari understood the BwO as essentially collective, at least if this is taken to mean a collective human subject or a shared political body. Their conception is more complex: the BwO can be produced through both individual and collective experimentation, although its constitution is never simply a matter of individual subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari describe it as “necessarily a Collectivity” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 161), understood in terms of heterogeneous assemblages of bodies, forces, things and intensities rather than exclusively human social groupings.

They also give us a distinction that helps. Alongside individual BwOs they describe the plane of consistency, which they present as the gathering of all BwOs, a field in which many bodies without organs can connect and compose with one another (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), much like what may happen in the Autistic Rhizome (Gray-Hammond, 2023; Edgar, 2023). If a single BwO is the loosening of one organism, the plane of consistency is where loosened bodies meet. Symphrenia, we want to suggest, lives on that plane. It names what happens when bodyminds that have each loosened a little find they can think and feel through one another in community spaces where they can experiment and become within safer, agreed boundaries.

Phrēn: why the word matters

Symphrenia joins the Greek syn, “with” or “together”, to phrēn. In early Greek, phrēn referred to the midriff or diaphragm and also to the seat of thought and feeling. The word holds mind and body in one place, close to the breath, which suits a concept grounded in the bodymind, which we draw on throughout our work (Dychtwald, 1977).

Phrēn is also the root of “schizophrenia”, the “split mind”, and we wanted to highlight that connection as Deleuze and Guattari built schizoanalysis around the figure of the schizo. They used the word for a process of desire that escapes the organism, and only secondarily for a clinical category. We do not offer symphrenia as the opposite of schizophrenia, and we do not offer it as a cure or a clinical category; we offer it as a way of queering how we understand hyper-connected ways of perceiving the world.

People who experience psychosis, voices, visuals, or other unusual perceptions are not broken. What symphrenia questions is the picture of the mind on which both “split” and “whole” depend: a sealed, individual container that is either intact or damaged. Mad and neurodivergent communities have long challenged that picture. Symphrenia joins them in suggesting that every bodymind is already threaded through with others. In this regard, symphrenia offers a reconnection between Madness and neurodivergence that Kassiane Asasumasu (2023), who coined the term neurodivergent, explicitly articulated, and which we feel has been somewhat lost over time.

What makes symphrenia distinct

A concept earns its place by what it does. Ian Buchanan (2021) makes this point sharply, warning that Deleuzian terms used too loosely become adjectives that decorate a sentence without cutting anything (p. 40). We take the warning seriously and are trying our best to honour their work whilst also being aware that neither of us is a Deleuzian scholar, and that this writing is being built, and is becoming, from within our community. Here we want to set out what symphrenia offers that neighbouring concepts do not, while recognising that our own thinking is always made with others.

Haraway’s (2016) sympoiesis describes systems making themselves with one another, at every scale from bacteria to ecosystems. She offers it partly as a corrective to autopoiesis, the idea that living systems produce and maintain themselves. Niklas Luhmann (1995) carried autopoiesis into social theory. For him, a system reproduces itself through its own operations and is operationally closed: minds and social systems can be coupled to one another and can unsettle one another, but neither can enter the other directly.

Co-regulation, as used in psychology, usually describes one nervous system calming another, often in a caregiver and child. Bateson’s (1972) ecology of mind places thought in whole systems of organism and environment. Symphrenia draws on all of these, but it is more specific. It concerns the phrēn, the place where thinking and feeling happen in a breathing body, and we are suggesting it grows from neurodivergent experience in particular. Many of us live with bodyminds that are more porous to sound, light, mood and atmosphere, and we are often told that this porousness is a deficit; we may be told that we are too much or that what we are seeing and hearing is not real.

Symphrenia treats it all as a way of knowing that disrupts neuronormative expectations of how we are ‘supposed’ to be. It also carries a socio-political claim that distress, regulation and understanding cannot be located inside individual heads, however neatly clinical systems would like to place them there.

Luhmann is useful to us because he insists on closure. Autistic life often moves between two needs: to be open and porous to the world, and to close off when that openness becomes too much, as happens in shutdown. A purely sympoietic account can lose sight of the second need, while a purely autopoietic one makes the first look impossible. Symphrenia holds both. A symphrenic bodymind keeps its own ways of making itself, its rhythms, passions and boundaries, while also being shaped through the relations it is coupled to. The membrane we return to below sits at this meeting point between closure and openness.

Symphrenia has edges. It excludes masking for the sake of a group, because a shared field built on one person’s suppression is the organism wearing a friendlier face. It excludes one-way co-regulation, where a neurodivergent person is always expected to adjust to others and never the reverse. And it excludes fusion, which we come back to later in this series.

References

Asasumasu, K. (2023, July 27). Kassiane Asasumasu on neurodivergent [Video]. Foundations for Divergent Minds, YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J0BP5nbgdu4

Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an ecology of mind. Chandler.

Buchanan, I. (2021). The incomplete project of schizoanalysis. Edinburgh University Press.

Deleuze, G. (1988). Spinoza: Practical philosophy (R. Hurley, Trans.). City Lights. (Original work published 1981)

Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia (B. Massumi, Trans.). University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1980)

Dychtwald, K. (1977). Bodymind. Pantheon Books.

Edgar, H. (2023, April 22). Autistic rhizome. Stimpunks Foundation. https://stimpunks.org/glossary/autistic-rhizome/

Edgar, H., & Gray-Hammond, D. (2026, October 7). Symphrenia. The Wider Existence. https://www.thewiderexistence.co.uk/p/symphrenia

Gray-Hammond, D. (2023, April 21). Neuro-anarchy and the rise of the Autistic Rhizome. NeuroHub Connect. https://neurohubcommunity.org/2023/04/21/neuro-anarchy-and-the-rise-of-the-autistic-rhizome/

Haraway, D. J. (2016). Staying with the trouble: Making kin in the Chthulucene. Duke University Press.

Luhmann, N. (1995). Social systems (J. Bednarz Jr. & D. Baecker, Trans.). Stanford University Press. (Original work published 1984)